This paper presents a model of information quality and political regime change. If enough citizens act against a regime, it is overthrown. Citizens are imperfectly informed about how hard this will be and the regime can, at a cost, engage in propaganda so that at face-value it seems hard. The citizens are rational and evaluate their information knowing the regime's incentives. The model makes three predictions. First, even rational citizens may not correctly infer the amount of manipulation. Second, as the intrinsic quality of information available becomes sufficiently high, the regime is more likely to survive. Third, the regime benefits from uncertainty about the amount of manipulation, and consequently, as it becomes cheaper to manipulate, the regime is also more likely to survive. Key results of the benchmark static model extend to a simple dynamic setting where there are waves of unrest.
New information technologies like radio and film helped make the propaganda machinery of these regimes extraordinarily effective.
2 So, should we be optimistic that recent breakthroughs in information technology will lead to the collapse of present-day autocratic regimes? To put structure on this question, I develop a formal model of information quality and regime change. It suggests that perhaps we should not be optimistic. Section 1 outlines the model. A coordination game is played between an autocratic regime and a heterogeneous population of citizens. These citizens can either subvert the regime or not. Their actions are strategic complements and if enough of them subvert the regime it is overthrown. Citizens are imperfectly informed about how hard this will be, and, in making their decisions, must decide if others share their beliefs. The information available also depends on exogenous technological parameters and on actions taken by the regime in a deliberate attempt to manipulate information.
A regime manipulates information by taking a costly hidden action that shifts the distribution of signals from which citizens sample. This action lets the regime generate signals that at facevalue suggest it will be difficult to overthrow. The citizens are rational and form beliefs knowing that their information is contaminated by this propaganda.
In equilibrium, citizens' beliefs and the regime's manipulation must be mutually consistent.
Section 2 characterizes the unique equilibrium of this model and explains why rational citizens are not able to infer the amount of manipulation. Since individuals are imperfectly informed about the regime's 'type' they are also imperfectly informed about the amount of manipulation that has occurred. On average, individuals do discount their information because of the regime's misrepresentation, but they may not discount enough.
Section 3 shows the effects of changes in the information environment. As the intrinsic quality or precision of signals becomes sufficiently high, the regime is more likely to survive. The regime's propaganda apparatus is more effective when individuals are receiving, from a technological standpoint, intrinsically high quality signals. I interpret this as suggesting that the information revolution may not be as threatening to autocratic regimes as is sometime supposed. Loosely speaking, the regime is able to 'co-opt' the information revolution so that coordination against the regime becomes more difficult. More precisely, in equilibrium regimes are overthrown if their type is below an endogenous threshold. If a regime manipulates it generates a signal distribution with an artificially high mean that is strictly greater than this threshold. So if signals are precise, in this situation many citizens have signals suggesting the regime will survive. And consequently it is rational for any citizen, when contemplating the beliefs of others, to assign relatively high probability to the event that they mostly have signals near this artificially high mean. At the margin this makes any citizen less likely to attack and so the aggregate mass who do is relatively
small. This in turn makes it more likely that the regime does manipulate to create an artificially high signal mean thereby validating the original beliefs.
I then ask if a reduction in the cost of information manipulation will help regimes survive.
In principle, a reduction in the cost of information manipulation has complicated effects because it increases the amount of manipulation a regime wants to do but this change in the regime's incentives is known to citizens and they may be able to offset it. It turns out that regimes benefit from uncertainty about the amount of manipulation. As costs fall, this uncertainty increases and so do a regime's chances of surviving. Lower costs of manipulation benefit the regime. Section 4 uses the model to interpret research on the policies that China and Cuba have used to offset the effects of the information revolution. I argue that there is support for the model's prediction that regimes benefit because they are able to co-opt an increase in the intrinsic quality of information in a way that makes coordination more difficult. The model also helps reconcile the views of researchers who argue that these regimes are successfully exploiting new technologies to counter dissent [e.g., Kalathil and Boas (2003) ] with those who argue that any success is due to more traditional authoritarian methods such as arrest and seizure [e.g., Chase and Malvenon (2002) ]. The model implies that these policies for coping with dissent are complements.
In related work, Ginkel and Smith (1999) study a game between three unitary agents: a regime, a group of dissidents, and the mass public. They focus on dissidents' uncertainty about the regime surviving and consider signaling by the regime. There is no information heterogeneity in their model, however -dissidents and the public both receive the same noisy signal of the regime's type -and so there is no question of coordination failure or difficulty in forecasting-the-forecastsof-others. Karklins and Petersen (1993) show how mass unrest is constructed by individuals playing a sequence of 'assurance games'. They provide a rich discussion of coalition formation, but do not consider information in a detailed way. Kuran (1991) and Lohmann (1994) are expressly concerned with the role of information and the sudden overthrow of the Eastern European communist regimes.
Although details differ, both draw on the notion of an information cascade to generate sudden regime change. To bridge some of the distance between the static benchmark model of this paper and the models of Kuran (1991) and Lohmann (1994) , Section 5 considers an extension with waves of unrest and accumulation of information about the regime and shows that key results of the static benchmark model extend to this more dynamic setting.
This paper draws on the 'global games' approach to coordination games with imperfect information that was pioneered by Carlsson and van Damme (1993) and Morris and Shin (1998 , 2000 . Coordination games often have multiple self-fulfilling equilibria. In the global games approach, imperfect information about the underlying fundamentals can serve to select a unique equilibrium.
3 This paper differs from earlier global games papers because individuals' information is not exogenous but instead is endogenous through the regime's manipulation decision. -i-Miquel (2008) also use the global games approach in a political economy model. 4 Angeletos, Hellwig, and Pavan (2006) analyze a closely related global game where information is endogenous because of signaling by the regime and show that this leads back to equilibrium multiplicity. The key difference between the papers is that, in the version of their model closest to this paper, individuals get two noisy signals, one of an endogenous policy action that is a function of an underlying state and another of the underlying state itself. By contrast, in this paper individuals get one noisy signal of a function that depends on both the endogenous policy action and the underlying state. In a sense, individuals in this paper have 'less' information. Debs (2007) provides an approach complementary to this paper. He shows how an autocratic regime can use the media to implement divide-and-rule policies that may thwart an attempted overthrow. He provides a more nuanced model of a regime's use of information manipulation but abstracts from the coordination issues that are at the heart of this paper. Other related work includes Besley and Prat (2006) , who examine how characteristics of the media market determine how close the relationship is between the press and a government (i.e., the equilibrium degree of media freedom), and Egorov, Guriev, and Sonin (2006) who argue that a free media is less likely to emerge in resource rich economies.
A motivating example: Ottoman Turkey. Nineteenth century Ottoman Turkey was a brutal autocracy. But technological breakthroughs like railroads, telegraphs, steamships and mass newspapers -printed in Arabic, Persian and Turkish -spurred interest in world developments and provided citizens of the Empire with a massive increase in the quality of their information. If technological and informational improvements of this kind help overthrow autocratic regimes, then one might think the citizens of the Ottoman Empire would be well placed to force change.
But no such change took place. The same improvements in information technologies also gave the regime more control over its subjects. The ability to monitor communications and to rapidly deploy troops both increased the power the regime could exercise directly and helped undermine traditional sources of countervailing power. For decades, until the end of the Empire in the aftermath of the First World War, improvements in information technology enabled more effective autocratic rule (Hodgson, 1974, 253-256) .
By contrast, in his discussion of this period of Ottoman history, Lewis (2002) argues that recent technological developments lead in the opposite direction:
Television and satellite, fax and internet, have brought and imposed a new openness, and are beginning to undermine the closed society and closed minds that sustain autocracy. Similarly, the spread of education or at least of literacy to much larger elements of the population has again imposed new limits on the autocracy of rulers ... (Lewis, 2002, 54) .
But why? Why are these developments different; why have the late twentieth century's telegraphs and steamships imposed limits to autocracy when their precursors did not?
Model of information, coordination and regime change
There is a unit mass of citizens, indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. Citizens are ex ante identical. After drawing a signal (discussed below) each decides whether to subvert the regime, s i = 1, or not, s i = 0. The population mass of subversives is S := 1 0 s i di. Citizens expect to get a larger payoff if they are involved in the downfall of the regime. If the regime is overthrown a citizen gets random reward w ∈ {w, w} with w < w and Pr(w = w) := µ(s i ) with 0 ≤ µ(1) < µ(0) ≤ 1, so there is more chance of getting w if s i = 1. The utility cost of subverting is κ > 0.
If a citizen believes the regime will be overthrown with probability P i , she will subvert when the expected payoff from doing so is at least as large as that from not subverting, specifically if and only if
equivalently, if and only if
where p summarizes the opportunity cost or 'price' of subverting. If p ≥ 1 it can never be rational for a citizen to participate in subversion. To make the model interesting, then, we need:
Assumption 1. The opportunity cost of subversion is not too high: p < 1.
A citizen with P (x i ) < p chooses not to subvert, in part, because of the incentive to free-ride [cf. Olson (1971) ]. Intuitively, this incentive is weak if the probability of being caught out µ(0) is sufficiently high or if the penalty w − w from being caught is sufficiently severe.
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The citizens face a regime indexed by a hidden state θ that is the regime's private information.
The state θ is normalized so that the regime is overthrown if and only if θ < S. The preferences of citizens can be represented by
where 1 denotes the indicator function. Individual actions s i and the population aggregate S are strategic complements: the more citizens subvert the regime, the more likely it is that the regime is overthrown and so the more likely it is that any individual citizen's best action is to also subvert.
After learning θ, a regime may take a hidden action a ≥ 0 that incurs a convex cost C(a) where C(0) = 0, C (a) > 0 for a > 0 and C (a) ≥ 0 for all a. The regime obtains a benefit θ − S from remaining in power and so has a direct aversion to S. Regimes prefer to avoid a Prague Spring or a Tiananmen Square. Suppressing a revolt is resource costly to the regime and this cost is increasing in the mass of rioters.
6 If θ < S, the regime is overthrown and obtains an outside option with value normalized to zero. The payoff to a regime is therefore
where
Following a regime's hidden action a, each citizen simultaneously draws an idiosyncratic signal x i := θ+a+ε i where the noise ε i is independent of θ and is IID normally distributed with mean zero 5 Perhaps retribution is exacted on those who are thought to have let others take the risks in overthrowing the regime. See, respectively, Jackson (2001) and Frommer (2005) for discussion of the retribution exacted on collaborators after the liberation of France and Czechoslovakia from Nazi rule.
6 Also, and loosely speaking, observations of large S might be able to convince foreign powers that it would be easy to assist the regime's opponents in bringing the regime down. As emphasized by Skocpol (1979) , deteriorating relations with foreign powers can provide crucial opportunities for social unrest.
and precision α (that is, variance α −1 ). So the density of signals is f (
where φ denotes the standard normal density. I begin by assuming that citizens have common priors for θ and that this prior is the (improper) uniform distribution over the whole real line. 7 The realization of the signal x i is informative for both the type of the regime θ and the hidden action a. This action is itself informative about the regime's type and rational citizens take this into account when forming their beliefs. In equilibrium, the action taken by a regime and the beliefs of citizens will need to be mutually consistent. The timing of the model is shown in Figure 1 . 
Equilibrium concept
A symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium is an individual's posterior density π(θ|x i ), individual subversion decision s(x i ), mass of subversives S(θ, a) and hidden actions a(θ) such that
The first condition says that a citizen with information x i takes into account the regime's manipulation a(θ). The second says that given these beliefs, s(x i ) is chosen to maximize its expected payoff. The third condition aggregates individual decisions to give the mass of subversives. The final condition says that the actions a(θ) maximize the regime's payoff.
Further discussion of model
Interpretation of hidden actions. The hidden action a ≥ 0 of the regime gives it the potential to bias the information citizens receive. If a > 0 citizens draw from a signal distribution that at face value suggests the regime will be difficult to overthrow. This represents a situation where it is common knowledge that the regime is able to exert pressure on editors, force recalcitrant generals to stand on parade, etc -so as to depict itself as difficult to overthrow -but where it is not possible to observe that pressure directly and it instead must be inferred.
Nature of the regime. The regime is autocratic in that it is socially desirable for the regime to be removed and it is not opposed by competing political parties or engaged in strategic interactions with other large players. The one-dimensional θ summarizes many characteristics of regimes. More malevolent regimes have a high θ because they are willing to plunder society and have greater incentive to resist a given amount of dissent. And since the regime is treated as a unitary actor, θ also captures its degree of internal cohesion. If the regime is riven by factions or if the military is ambivalent in its support, the regime may be more vulnerable. Similarly, θ is also affected by the policies of foreign powers and their willingness to intervene for or against the regime in the event of an attempted overthrow. Critically, the regime's type captures those aspects of the society about which the regime has better information than do citizens.
Simultaneous moves and lack of communication. Every citizen receives her signal and makes her decision simultaneously. There is no communication between them. Any concerns about informers and the consequences of organizing against a regime also affect θ. If a lot of credible communication is possible, θ is presumably lower. Section 5 below relaxes the assumption of simultaneous moves, allowing a sub-set of citizens to receive information from the collective behavior of other citizens.
Common knowledge of the opportunity cost of subversion. The opportunity cost of subversion p is common knowledge and instead what is unknown is the regime's type θ. An alternative formulation would be to have θ common knowledge but have individuals with different p i that is private information and that vary idiosyncratically in the population (around some mean that depends on the regime's action). The advantage of this formulation would be that it would bring the model closer to existing work on information, coordination and regime change -such as Kuran (1991) and Lohmann (1994) , who emphasize lack of common knowledge about citizens' levels of discontent and willingness to act against the regime. I have chosen to make p common knowledge and to make the uncertainty be about θ so as to maintain continuity with existing work on global games.
As discussed below, these provide convenient benchmarks against which to judge the effectiveness of information manipulation. 
Exogenous information benchmarks
Two important special cases of the model are when: (i) the regime's type is common knowledge, or
(ii) hidden actions are prohibitively expensive. In each case, citizens have exogenous information.
If θ is common knowledge, costly hidden actions are pointless and a(θ) = 0 all θ. The model reduces to a simple coordination game with multiple equilibria. If θ < 0, any crowd S ≥ 0 can overthrow the regime. It is optimal for any individual to subvert, all do so, and the regime is overthrown. If θ ≥ 1, no crowd can overthrow the regime. It is optimal for any individual to not subvert, none do, and the regime survives. If θ ∈ [0, 1), the regime is 'fragile' and multiple self-fulfilling equilibria can be sustained. For example, if each individual believes that everyone else will subvert, it will be optimal for each citizen to do so and S = 1 > θ leads to the regime's overthrow and the vindication of initial expectations.
If hidden actions are prohibitively expensive, a(θ) = 0 all θ and each citizen has signal x i = θ + ε i . Because each citizen has a signal of the regime's type, expectations are not arbitrary. As discussed by Carlsson and van Damme (1993) , Morris and Shin (1998) and subsequent literature, this introduces the possibility of a unique equilibrium outcome.
9 In this equilibrium, strategies are threshold rules: there is a unique type θ * such that the regime is overthrown for θ < θ * and a unique signal x * such that a citizen subverts for x < x * . Figure 2 illustrates.
where Φ denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution. In particular, θ *
If there are no hidden actions, a citizen with x i assigns Pr(θ < θ *
] to the regime being overthrown and so the first condition says that if the regime's threshold is θ * MS , a citizen with signal x i = x * MS will be indifferent between subverting or not. Given this, the mass of subversives is Pr(
] and a regime with type θ = θ * MS will be indifferent. In the analysis below, I say that a regime's hidden action technology is effective if in equilibrium it does better than the Morris-Shin benchmark, θ * < θ * MS = 1 − p. A lower θ * increases the regime's ex ante survival probability making it more likely that nature draws a θ ≥ θ * .
As information becomes precise, some regimes are faced with a large incentive to shift the signal mean. To see this, notice that in the Morris-Shin benchmark, the mass of subversives is
As precision α → ∞, the mass S(θ) → 1{1 − p − θ}, a step function. So if the regime has θ < θ * MS = 1 − p it faces a unit mass of subversives, but if the regime has θ > θ * MS it faces zero subversives. A small reduction in θ * MS would enable a regime with θ just smaller than θ * MS to switch from being overthrown to surviving. As information becomes precise, there is a large incentive for marginal regimes to shift the signal mean.
To understand the consequences of information sets that are a function of the regime's manipulation, we need to study a more difficult equilibrium problem where the regime's manipulation is not trivial and citizens internalize a regime's incentives. 
There is a unique equilibrium and it is characterized by a threshold θ * such that the regime is overthrown for θ < θ * .
Equilibrium with endogenous information manipulation
This model has a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium (Edmond, 2008) . As in the Morris-Shin benchmark, the equilibrium is characterized by thresholds x * and θ * so that for citizens s(x i ) = 1 for x i < x * and zero otherwise while the regime is overthrown for θ < θ * and not otherwise.
But with endogenous information the regime's hidden actions also need to be taken into account.
Section 2.1 show how to compute the equilibrium. Section 2.2 sketches the properties of hidden actions. Section 2.3 explains why citizens have difficulty inferring the amount of manipulation.
Solving for the equilibrium
Letx denote a candidate for the citizens' threshold in equilibrium and let θx and ax(θ) denote candidates for the regime's threshold and hidden actions givenx.
Regime's problem. Takingx as given the mass of citizens facing the regime is
Since the regime has access to an outside option normalized to zero, its problem can be written
where Wx(θ) is the best payoff regime θ can get if it is not overthrown
Using the envelope theorem and the definition of Sx(θ + a) in equation (11) shows that W x (θ) > 1 all θ. And since Wx(θ) < 0 for θ < 0 and Wx(1) > 0, by the intermediate value theorem there is a unique θx ∈ [0, 1) such that Wx(θx) = 0. Using (12), the regime is overthrown if and only if θ < θx. Since positive actions are costly, the regime takes no action for θ < θx. Otherwise, for θ ≥ θx, the actions of the regime solve
and the threshold θx is found from the indifference condition Wx(θx) = 0, or more explicitly
Takingx as given, (14)- (15) simultaneously determine the threshold θx and the hidden actions ax(θ) that characterize the solution to the regime's problem.
Because of the additive signal structure a unit increase in θ and a unit increase inx perfectly offset each other in terms of their effect on the regime's desired action. Given this, hidden actions will depend only on the difference θ −x. This implies that the family of hidden action functions ax(θ) can be represented by a single function a : R → R + that takes θ −x as an argument.
Citizens' problem. Suppose almost all citizens subvert the regime when they have signals x <x and the corresponding solution to the regime's problem is given by threshold θx and hidden actions ax(θ) from (14)- (15). For eachx we can construct the posterior probability assigned by a citizen with signal x i to the regime's overthrow. Write this probability as P (θx, x i ,x) where
where the numerator uses ax(θ) = 0 for θ <θ and where the denominator uses the representation
Since θx is pinned down byx through (14)- (15), this probability is a function only ofx and the citizen's signal x i . To acknowledge this, write K(x, x i ) := P (θx, x i ,x). An argument given in Edmond (2008) shows that K is strictly decreasing in x i , and for anyx satisfies
For x i =x in particular K(x,x) = P (θx −x, 0, 0). Now a citizen with signal x i will subvert the regime if and only if K(x, x i ) ≥ p. Therefore given the solution to the regime's problem as implied by (14)- (15), the signal thresholdx solves
Solving the problems simultaneously. Since K is strictly decreasing in x i with K(x, −∞) = 1 and
This solution can be plugged into (15) to obtain a unique threshold θ * ∈ [0, 1) so that we know both θ * and x * separately. The equilibrium hidden actions are then a(θ) := a(θ − x * ). Moreover Edmond (2008) shows that only this equilibrium survives the iterative elimination of (interim) strictly dominated strategies and so it is the only perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game.
Regime's hidden actions
In equilibrium, hidden actions a(θ) are characterized by the first order necessary condition
The marginal benefit of an action is the associated reduction in the mass of subversives and at an interior solution this is equated to C (a). For manipulation to occur (meaning a(θ) > 0 for at least some θ), the cost function either has to be either (i) strictly convex, or (ii) if marginal costs are constant, C (a) = c all a, then the level of c cannot be 'too high': c < √ αφ(0) =: c. If either of these conditions is satisfied, then actions are zero for all θ < θ * before jumping up discontinuously to a positive value at the threshold θ * . As the fundamentals of the regime become strong, costly actions taken to generate a favorable signal distribution encounter diminishing returns and the action profile dies to zero. Figure 3 illustrates. Example: constant marginal costs. Let C(a) := ca for some constant c ∈ (0, c) where c := √ αφ (0) so that a(θ) > 0 for some θ. Then rearranging equation (19) shows that interior solutions to the regime's problem are given by
where θ * * := x * + γ and where
This is an acute case of 'signal-jamming'. All regimes that manipulate information pool on the same distribution of signals. Citizens receive signals x i = x * + γ + ε i that are locally completely uninformative about θ. If a regime manipulates, it generates signals with an artificially high mean x * + γ = θ * * > θ * and as α becomes large these signals are tightly clustered around θ * * .
Why can a regime manipulate beliefs in equilibrium?
If rational citizens know the regime's decision problem, shouldn't they be able to adjust their signal to account for the incentives of the regime so that at equilibrium manipulation has no effect? This intuition is wrong. If there is lack of common knowledge of the regime's type, a regime may manipulate information in equilibrium so long as different types of regimes would take different actions. To see this, suppose to the contrary that citizens 'know' any regime will take a constant actionâ > 0 (say) irrespective of θ. Then each citizen would adjust their signal up one-for-one withâ so that the signal threshold would be x * +â and the corresponding mass of subversives
Since actions are costly, the regime would be better off with a = 0 and so this cannot be an equilibrium.
Any interesting candidate for an equilibrium action profile will not involve a constantâ independent of θ, because if actions are costly it is never optimal for a regime to take an action in a state that corresponds to it being overthrown in equilibrium. This means that each citizen is unsure about what action has actually taken and, under the right conditions, this uncertainty 11 can give the regime some scope to manipulate information in equilibrium.
Example: uncertainty about regime's action. To see this, suppose a(θ) = 0 for θ < θ * , but a(θ) = a > 0 for θ ≥ θ * . Also, for simple calculations let p = 1/2. In the Morris-Shin benchmark, from (37), this would give θ * MS = 1 − p = 1/2 and x *
(1/2) = 0. But for this example conditions (15)- (18) with a(θ) =â > 0 for θ ≥ θ * simplify to
So ifâ > 0 and the action profile is not constant, the probability Φ(− √ αâ/2) < Φ(0) = 1/2 = θ * MS and the regime can achieve a lower threshold (an ex ante higher survival probability) and this 11 Citizens know the equilibrium hidden action function but do not know the exact value of θ and so are uncertain about which action a(θ) has been taken.
can be an equilibrium if the cost C(â) is not too large.
12 Moreover, holding fixed θ * , the signal threshold x * does not rise one-for-one with the level of the actionâ: it only rises byâ/2. The marginal citizen discounts their signal on account of the manipulation, but not by enough.
Once we recognize that different types of regimes take different actions, there is no common discount factor that each individual can apply to her signal so as to 'undo' the manipulation. The right discount factor to use depends on θ, but the citizens have heterogeneous beliefs about θ. The ability of a regime to successfully manipulate information is inextricably linked to heterogeneity in beliefs. If θ were common knowledge, costly information manipulation would be pointless. But with lack of common knowledge of θ, there is no agreement on the appropriate discount factor to
give to an individual's signal.
Equilibrium cross-section of beliefs. The marginal factor associated with each citizen's posterior provides a measure of the discount that different citizens want to apply to their signals. Suppose a citizen with x i was 'naive' and believed she lived in the benchmark Morris-Shin world. Then she would give probability Φ[ √ α(θ * − x i )] to the regime's overthrow. But a 'sophisticated' citizen who takes into account a(θ) > 0 for θ ≥ θ * will instead give this event probability
The marginal m(x i ) is a measure of the discrepancy between the sophisticated and the naive beliefs: a citizen with m(x i ) < 1 assigns less probability to the regime's survival if she acts 'sophisticated'. Figure 4 illustrates. For low x i , the marginal is less than one and citizens discount their signals but for high x i the marginal is greater than one. Why does the marginal have this shape? First, extreme signals result in marginals that are close to one since as x i → −∞ or x i → +∞ citizens assign almost the same probability to the regime's survival irrespective of concerns about manipulation. Second, the mere existence of the technology for manipulating signals is a form of aggregate information. Consider citizens with low signals. Since hidden actions are non-negative, if a citizen has a low signal it is likely that the regime's true type is low and that it did not manipulate. But at equilibrium, if a regime did no manipulation it must be because its survival probability is zero. Hence a citizen with a low signal will at equilibrium discount that signal yet further, m(x i ) < 1. The possibility of signal manipulation plus the low realized signal itself reinforce each other to convince a citizen that the regime's type must be low. Similarly, a high signal might be because of manipulation, but active manipulation means that at equilibrium the regime will survive with probability one. So if you have a high signal, you will rationally assign more 12 As shown in Section 3.2 below, the equilibrium in this example is obtained if we restrict actions to a ∈ [0, a] then let the cost of information manipulation become small (but remain positive). In this case, the equilibrium hidden action profile is a(θ) = a for θ ≥ θ * and zero otherwise. (23)- (24) for various precisions α. A citizen with m(x i ) < 1 assigns less probability to the regime's survival if she takes into account manipulation; a citizen with m(x i ) > 1 assigns more probability to the regime's survival.
probability to the regime's survival than you would if you were naive, m(x i ) > 1. The existence of a technology for manipulating signals amplifies the ex ante heterogeneity in information, leading those with low signals to assign even less survival probability to the regime and leading those with high signals to assign even more survival probability to the regime.
Use of manipulation vs. effectiveness of manipulation. The logic of this model is somewhat reminiscent of classic signaling games, e.g., Spence (1974) , in that the regime is able to send a (noisy) signal in equilibrium and this enables some weaker regime types to pool with stronger regime types.
Whether this pooling behavior is effective in equilibrium is another matter. In principle, it might be true that the only regime types that are able to imitate stronger regime types are those regimes that would have survived even in the absence of the information manipulation technology. Moreover, it might also be true that some weak regimes that would survive if they could commit to not using the manipulation technology are overthrown because they cannot make that commitment.
In short, regimes may manipulate information in equilibrium but it does not follow that manipulation is necessarily effective in increasing the likelihood of the regime surviving. As shown next, it turns out that manipulation is effective when the signal precision α is sufficiently high.
Information revolutions
This section studies changes in the information environment. Section 3.1 shows that if signals are of high enough quality, manipulation is effective. Section 3.2 shows that if the costs of information manipulation fall, regimes will have higher survival probabilities despite the fact that citizens know they have an incentive to take larger actions.
Terminology. I measure the effectiveness of manipulation by its ability to reduce the threshold θ * relative to the Morris-Shin benchmark of θ * MS = 1 − p. A lower θ * increases the regime's ex ante survival probability making it more likely that nature draws a θ ≥ θ * . I say that the regime benefits from lower θ * even though this does not necessarily increase the regime's payoff. It might be that lower θ * is achieved through large, costly actions that give the regime an overall lower payoff than they would get if hidden actions were impossible.
Increases in intrinsic signal quality
Let θ * α , x * α , and a α (θ) denote the equilibrium thresholds and hidden action profile indexed by the precision α. Then: (15) and (18) 
and
where writing γ α acknowledges that coefficient defined in (21) also depends on the precision. For each α > 0, these two equations uniquely determine x * α , θ * α [solve (25) for the unique difference 13 As discussed following equation (20) if the marginal cost at zero is too large C (0) > c := √ αφ(0), then the cost of information manipulation is so high that the model reduces to the standard Morris-Shin game. When we take α → ∞ this bound does not matter. When we take α → 0 + this bound will be violated. Consequently, the second part of Proposition 2 deals only with the case of strictly convex costs. 
This is strictly decreasing in α and S * α → 0 + as α → ∞. High α helps the regime engineer a small mass of subversives. In turn, this means that as α → ∞ all regimes with θ ≥ 0 will survive. For large α solutions to equation (25) are approximately the same as solutions to
The only solution to equation (28) is θ * α −x * α = 0. So as α → ∞, solutions to equation (25) approach zero too. From equation (26) we now know θ * α → 0 + . Therefore, manipulation is effective when the precision α is large enough. For large α the threshold θ * α is less than the Morris-Shin benchmark of θ * MS = 1 − p and the regime's survival probability is correspondingly higher.
Intuition for the result. Staying with the special case of constant marginal costs, if a regime manipulates, then from (20), it generates a signal distribution with an artificially high mean that is strictly greater than the threshold, x * + γ = θ * * > θ * . So if signals are precise, in this situation many citizens have signals suggesting the regime will survive. And consequently it is rational for any citizen, when contemplating the beliefs of others, to assign relatively high probability to the event that they mostly have signals near this artificially high mean θ * * > θ * . At the margin this makes any individual citizen less likely to attack and so the aggregate mass who do is relatively small. This in turn makes it more likely that the regime does manipulate and create an artificially high signal mean, thereby validating the original beliefs.
Numerical examples. With general cost functions the model cannot be solved analytically. Figure 6 shows θ * α as a function of precision α under the assumption that C(a) := 0.5a 2 for three levels of p. The higher the individual opportunity cost p, the lower the threshold and the thresholds are decreasing in the signal precision. In these examples, the speed of convergence to the limit is faster if p is high and slower if p is low. If citizens pay a high individual cost p to attack the regime, the regime is more likely to benefit from high α. In this sense, high p and high α are complements.
Discussion and interpretation. These results suggest that a regime's less overt propaganda apparatus (pressure exerted on editors, generals forced to stand on parade, etc) will be more useful when individuals are receiving, from a technological standpoint, intrinsically high quality signals.
In equilibrium signals may be uninformative, but that is precisely because the regime is co-opting the technology to its own ends. 14 A regime will want to exert a strong influence over the media when the signal precision is high enough. Proposition 2 does not obtain because a regime is somehow able to get away with a big shift in the signal mean which, mechanically, would reduce the mass of subversives. Instead the actions are 'just big enough' and do not need to be large when precision α is high. As α increases the regime benefits from the technology for manipulation because it leads to a change in the composition of beliefs. Citizens receive signals through a high precision channel, but the regime is able to fine-tune the message that individuals receive in such a way that pivotal individuals -who might think the regime is fragile -do not act. Because of the coordination problem, this spills over to others and so the probability of the regime surviving increases.
Lower costs of information manipulation
Consider now a technological change that increases the costs of manipulation. In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, this has two effects. Taking as given citizens' beliefs, an increase in costs will decrease the regime's desired hidden action. But taking as given the regime's incentives this will also lead citizens to draw different inferences about the true θ. Which effect dominates? Let C k (a) denote a family of cost functions that satisfies 
where ν ∈ R is the unique solution of (1
As k → ∞, the costs of manipulation become extreme and no regime has a(θ) > 0. The model reduces to the Morris-Shin benchmark. Alternatively, suppose k → 0 + so that manipulation becomes cheap (but not costless). Then all regimes that survive in equilibrium will take the same largest hidden action a while all regimes that are overthrown will, as usual, take no action. Each citizen knows that the regime has taken one of these two positions. With some probability citizens view themselves as living in the Morris-Shin world and with complementary probability they live in a world where the mass of subversives will always be lower (in amount determined by a). Because of this, they are always more reluctant to subvert the regime and the equilibrium threshold is always less than the benchmark level 1 − p. So lower costs of information manipulation increase a regime's chances of survival. Figure 7 illustrates.
Moreover (29) shows that θ * 0 is strictly decreasing in the largest hidden action a and that as a → ∞ the state threshold θ * 0 → c > 0. When manipulation is cheap and very large hidden actions 
How do autocratic regimes respond to the information revolution?
The model predicts that as the intrinsic quality of information improves, regimes may be more likely to survive because in equilibrium they are able to, in a sense, co-opt the technology. That is, if a regime was unable to manipulate information then better information in the sense of a higher signal precision α would enable citizens to pinpoint the regime's type with accuracy, but when a regime can manipulate information then the regime itself can benefit from this better information (at least when α is high enough).
Drawing on the examples of China and Cuba, this section asks if there is evidence that regimes can benefit from co-opting an information revolution and concludes there is. The discussion focuses on the internet, but many points equally apply to satellite television and cell phones and related network technologies.
China
There is a degree of consensus that Chinese authorities, at least for the moment, have succeeded in countering the effects of the information revolution [Chase and Malvenon (2002); Fallows (2008) ; Kalathil and Boas (2003) ; Lynch (1999) ]. Dissident groups -whether they be pro-democracy ac-tivists, Chinese nationalists, Falungong spiritualists, Tibetan nationalists, and activists on various sides of the Taiwan question -have not been able to use new technologies to threaten the regime.
But there is less consensus as to how this successful off-setting of the information revolution has been achieved. On one side of the debate, Kalathil and Boas (2003, 25-29, 37-40) argue that
Chinese authorities have indeed successfully co-opted developments in information technology. In particular, Chinese authorities: i) monitor, filter, and block access to sensitive overseas web-sites and email addresses, 15 ii) require that internet service providers report on the activities of users, iii) require censorship of bulletin boards and chat rooms, iv) use the internet to directly spread propaganda and v) attempt to retard the effectiveness of dissident activities by hacking web-sites and overloading email addresses.
16
On the other side of the debate, Chase and Malvenon (2002) argue that the apparent success of the Chinese regime has come from traditional authoritarian methods demonstrating, through arrest, detention, and seizure, the supposed strength of the regime and the foolishness of engaging in subversive behavior. 17 For example, in December 1998, Wang Youcai, a leading member of the short-lived China Democracy Party (CDP) was sentenced to 11 years in jail based on email communications with activists in Hong Kong and the US. In November 1999, other CDP members received jail sentences of 5 to 10 years for communicating with organizations the regime disapproves of and for posting subversive messages on bulletin boards (Chase and Malvenon, 2002, 53) . A school teacher Jiang Shihua was jailed for two years for posting "We all think about one sentence that none of us will say: overthrow the Communist Party," (Kalathil and Boas, 2003, 26) .
But examples of apparent success using traditional authoritarian methods, as provided by Chase and Malvenon (2002) and Kalathil and Boas (2003) , are not inconsistent with the model. If the regime has a high willingness to imprison and otherwise punish dissent, then individuals face a high individual opportunity cost of subverting p (via the utility cost of subversion κ to which p is proportional). And as discussed in Section 3.1 a high p and improvements in the quality of information α are complementary in that the threshold θ * decreases faster in α when p is high (as illustrated in Figure 6 ). That is, if citizens pay a high individual cost p to attack the regime, the regime is more likely to benefit from high α. So, rather than being viewed as competing explanations, co-opting new technologies and traditional authoritarian practices should be seen as partial but mutually-reinforcing explanations of China's ability to offset the subversive effects of the information revolution.
Cuba
Both the US government and the Cuban exile community have attempted to use information provision to overthrow Castro's regime. Offsetting these efforts, the regime has engaged in relatively sophisticated attempts to jam US signals beamed into Cuba.
The CIA began covert broadcasts into Cuba as early as 1960, the year after Castro took power Soley (1987) . This policy became more explicit with the beginning of broadcasts by Radio Martí (or 'Radio Free Cuba') in 1985 and TV Martí in 1990 (Kalathil and Boas, 2003, 48) . Although radio broadcasts have had some success -at least in terms of attracting an audience, if not in terms of bringing about regime change -TV broadcasts by the US government have been notoriously unsuccessful due to Cuban jamming of the signal. In 2003, the US government began to upgrade TV Martí to a satellite broadcasting system in an attempt to strengthen the signal and beat the jamming. In addition to US government-sponsored broadcasts, Cuban exiles operating from the US have engaged in leaflet drops by plane.
Suppose we put aside any concerns that Cubans might have about the motives underlying external propaganda and agree to treat all extra information as a pure increase in the quality of their information. If we interpret an array of leaflet drops, satellite TV transmissions and sporadic internet access as an exogenous increase in the intrinsic quality of private information α, then from Proposition 2 we ought to predict that such improvements act to reduce coordination to the benefit of otherwise relatively weak regimes.
This prediction seems to be borne out in practice. So far, the regime has been relatively successful at blocking these sources of external propaganda. Foreign providers of information have had to rely on relatively diffuse means of communication to change the beliefs of the Cuban public. While this may improve the information available to Cubans, it may also suffer from an inability to generate a large mass of subversives willing to move against the regime. Improvements in information do not necessarily help solve the coordination problem.
Accumulating information and waves of unrest
In models of information and regime change based on information cascades, such as Kuran (1991) and Lohmann (1994) , individuals' decisions are staggered and some get to learn from the decisions of others. But in the benchmark model of this paper, individuals simultaneously receive their signals and so cannot learn from each other. This section extends the benchmark model by confronting the regime with two 'waves' of unrest that cumulate into an aggregate attack. By observing the outcome of the first wave (albeit with some noise), individuals in the second learn more about the likelihood of overthrowing the regime. And a regime will take this into account when deciding how to manipulate information. Key results of the static benchmark model of this paper extend to this dynamic setting.
Two waves of unrest. Let citizens be exogenously divided into two waves: a 'leading' wave of size λ ∈ (0, 1) and a 'following' wave of size 1 − λ. Let S 1 denote the fraction of citizens from the first wave who attack and let S 2 denote the fraction of citizens from the second wave who attack. The cumulative attack is then S := λS 1 + (1 − λ)S 2 and the regime is overthrown if S > θ.
Both waves get the idiosyncratic signal of the regime's type x i = θ+a+ε x,i with ε x,i IID normally distributed with mean zero and precision α x > 0. But in addition citizens in the second wave get endogenous idiosyncratic signals y i about the size of the first attack. Let y i := Φ −1 (S 1 ) + ε y,i where ε y,i is IID normally distributed with mean zero and precision α y > 0.
18 If citizens in the first wave attack when they have x i < x * 1 for some endogenous threshold x * 1 , the size of the first attack is
So the extra signals generated for the second wave are y i = √ α x (x * 1 − θ − a) + ε y,i . Since at equilibrium individuals will filter out the constant x * 1 , this is informationally equivalent to giving citizens in the second wave signals z i = θ + a + ε z,i where ε z,i is IID normally distributed with mean zero and endogenous precision α z = α x α y . If citizens in the second wave attack when they have x i < x * 2 (z i ) for some endogenous threshold function x * 2 (z i ), the size of the second attack is
The regime's hidden actions a(θ) and cutoff θ * solve
where S(θ, a) = λS 1 (θ, a) + (1 − λ)S 2 (θ, a) and
The single threshold x * 1 for the first wave and the threshold function x * 2 (z i ) for the second wave solve the indifference conditions
where the posteriors are calculated using Bayes's rule. An equilibrium of this model consists of scalars x * 1 and θ * and functions x * 2 (z i ) and a(θ) simultaneously satisfying (33)-(36).
18 The specification Φ −1 (S) for the signal mean was introduced (in a different context) by Dasgupta (2007) and gives rise to a simple information structure. With manipulation, a large enough α x implies both that θ * < 1 − p and that θ * is declining in α x so that better information increases a regime's likelihood of survival. All calculations use C(a) := 0.5a
2 and α z = α x .
Discussion. The accumulation of information through waves of unrest means that a regime's manipulation has both a direct and an indirect effect on beliefs. As usual, there is a direct effect through the signals x i . But there is also an indirect effect through the signals z i generated by the first attack. In choosing its policy a(θ) the regime has to take account of both channels.
This model of leaders and followers is based on Angeletos and Werning (2006) but differs in two respects. First, in Angeletos and Werning (2006) there is no information manipulation. And second, in their model, the information generated by the first-wave is public rather than idiosyncratic as it is here. This captures the idea that unrest may take place in many physically separated locations and individuals are likely to have idiosyncratically varying amounts of information about what has happened depending on how close they are to other centers of unrest.
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Numerical examples. Figure 8 shows θ * as a function of the signal precision α x for various sizes of the first wave attack λ and levels of p. The left panel shows a low cost of subversion, p = 0.25 while the right panel shows a high cost of subversion, p = 0.75. As in the static model, for high enough signal precision α x the threshold θ * is less than the benchmark Morris-Shin level of θ * MS = 1 − p and the regime benefits from the increase in precision. One difference is that with high p there is a non-monotonicity in θ * : for low α x , the thresholds are increasing and the regime is worse off than in the benchmark Morris-Shin case, but the thresholds reach a peak before falling for high enough α x . This monotonicity becomes less important when the size of the first wave is large. As λ → 1 the model reduces to the static case where we know from Figure 6 that θ * is monotonically declining in signal precision. The non-monotonicity emerges most clearly when p is relatively high, so that it is individually relatively costly to attack the regime and when λ is relatively low, so that most citizens are able to benefit from the first wave signal. For configurations of this kind, a large range of signal precisions α x is consistent with regime's doing worse than they would if they could commit to not use the information manipulation technology.
Skepticism about the results
The model that generates these results is stylized and it's reasonable to question it. Moreover, even researchers who have concluded that autocratic regimes like China have so far been successful in offsetting the impact of the information revolution are skeptical that this success can continue.
For example, While Beijing has done a remarkable job thus far of finding effective counterstrategies to what it perceives as the potential negative effects of the information revolution, the scale of China's information-technology modernization would suggest that time is eventually on the side of the regime's opponents (Chase and Malvenon, 2002, xiii) .
This section discusses several reasons why one might be skeptical of the results from the stylized model in this paper. I distinguish between two lines of arguments, one that focuses on ways that changes in information might in turn lead to changes in the individual opportunity cost of subversion p and another that focuses on the interpretation of 'better information'.
Changes in the individual cost of subversion. One way to formally justify skepticism of the kind expressed by Chase and Malvenon (2002) is to argue the main effect of the information revolution will not be to increase signal quality α but will instead be to reduce the individual cost of subversion p. For example, suppose that developments in information technology cause citizens in a closed autocratic society to learn that the return to overthrowing the regime is not w ∈ {w, w} as they had thought, but instead ξw for ξ > 1. This just means their opportunity cost falls to p/ξ < p. Or similarly, perhaps better communication technologies make organizing subversion easier so that the utility cost of subversion κ falls. This is also equivalent to a fall in p. The effects of such changes are straightforward: If citizens believed that the cost was p with return w and are surprised to learn it is ξw, for big enough ξ almost all citizens find it optimal to subvert, the ex ante survival probability of the regime falls, and no regime finds it worthwhile to take any hidden action.
Perhaps this is all that is meant when people talk enthusiastically of the role of information technologies in overthrowing autocracies. Maybe 'better information' means that citizens will learn the expected return to overthrowing the regime is larger than they had believed. This notion of an information revolution is quite Panglossian. As a partial corrective, in this paper I emphasize the more surprising result of Proposition 2, which suggest a dramatic increase in the intrinsic, technological, quality of information may be exploited by regimes to inhibit coordination and make their overthrow less likely. In reality, both notions of an information revolution are likely to be at play. Better information may help citizens in closed autocratic societies realize that their opportunities are not so limited, but it's important to realize that at the same time higher quality information may also help regimes inhibit coordination.
An alternative line of skepticism concerns the interpretation of 'better information'.
Better information means new channels of information? In this model citizens have only one kind of information and it is contaminated by the regime's manipulation. An alternative notion of an improvement in the quality of information is that individuals have access to many signals, some of which are manipulated by the regime, but some of which are uncontaminated by manipulation.
In such a setting, an information revolution would naturally be interpreted as a new channel of information or an increase in the precision of the signals that the regime cannot interfere with. It turns out that even an increase in the precision of the uncontaminated information can decrease the regime threshold θ * so that more regime types can survive in equilibrium. Why can regimes benefit from an increase in the precision of uncontaminated information? The intuition comes from thinking about the relative precision of the two kinds of information. If the uncontaminated signal has almost zero precision, then even though it is free of the regime's action citizens will give it almost no weight in the posterior. If so, the presence of an uncontaminated signal per se will not affect the analysis given above. Similarly, if the initial precision of the contaminated signal is high relative to the uncontaminated signal then the analysis of the benchmark model given above will go through, at least for moderate increases in the uncontaminated signal precision. Edmond (2008) provides several examples along these lines.
Better information means higher costs of manipulation? An alternative and complementary line of argument is that better information should be interpreted as many more channels of information all of which a regime can manipulate but only at greater cost. In the context of the model this would be higher signal precision that the same time shifts out the cost of information manipulation.
An increase in the signal precision will, at least if the level of precision is high enough, tend to benefit the regime but an increase in the cost of manipulation will tend to disadvantage the regime, so the net effect seems ambiguous. One response to this line of argument is that we know from Proposition 3 that when the costs of manipulation are large the model reduces to the Morris-Shin benchmark. So it seems likely that if the increase in costs is roughly proportional to the increase in signal precision, for large costs of information manipulation for which θ * ≈ θ * MS , an increase in the signal precision α would dominate the increase in costs so that θ * falls (especially if the level of α is low so that the effect of an increase in α is relatively large, as illustrated in Figure 6 ).
Conclusion
This paper presents a model of information quality and political regime change. If enough citizens act against a regime, it is overthrown. Citizens are imperfectly informed about how hard this will be and the regime can, at a cost, engage in propaganda so that at face-value it seems hard.
The most surprising result is that as the intrinsic quality of information becomes sufficiently high, the regime is more likely to survive. A regime can 'co-opt' a technological improvement in the quality of information to make coordination against it more difficult. Perhaps information revolutions are not so threatening to autocratic regimes as is often supposed.
The model yields two additional insights. First, even rational citizens may find it difficult to filter their information appropriately when they are playing a coordination game and need to forecast not only the behavior of the regime but also the behavior of their fellow citizens. Knowing a regime's incentives, citizens discount their signals. But they may not discount enough. Second, a fall in the cost of influencing information benefits regimes. Regimes benefit from uncertainty about the amount of manipulation they do. As the costs of manipulation fall, this uncertainty increases and so does the regime's probability of surviving.
The coordination game in this paper is deliberately stylized so as to focus attention on how a regime can implicitly co-opt an information revolution. In keeping things simple, I have abstracted from issues that could play a role in a more complete theory. For example, in this paper I have assumed free-riding is not a severe problem. But, rather than assuming it away, a more nuanced treatment would examine how citizens might alleviate the free-riding problem by using strategic communication to build credible coalitions. Similarly, rather than a mechanical 'lever' that simply shifts the distribution of signals, a richer model of information manipulation might draw on the insights of Debs (2007) concerning the use of polarizing or 'divide-and-rule' tactics to prevent attempts at overthrow. 
Appendix: Proofs
Since Φ(−w) = 1 − Φ(w) for all w ∈ R, adding these equalities gives θ * MS = 1 − p. And plugging this solution for θ * MS back into (37) and rearranging gives x *
The Proof of Proposition 2 is given in Edmond (2008) and is repeated here for completeness.
Proof of Proposition 2. For each precision α, there is a unique equilibrium. I find a unique solution to a constrained problem consisting of the original system of nonlinear equations plus a set of constraints that govern the asymptotic behavior of the endogenous variables. But, because the equilibrium conditions have a unique solution for each α, the solution to the original problem and to the constrained problem coincide. The equilibrium conditions can be written + . Then by assumption C k (a) and C k (a) → c > 0 for all a > 0. Since all positive actions cost the same amount in this limit, if a regime takes any positive action, it will take the biggest action, a. Hence it is common knowledge that either the regime take no action (if θ < lim k→0 + θ k ) or the regime takes action a = a (if θ ≥ lim k→0 + θ k ). To find the limiting thresholds x * 0 , θ * 0 follow the calculations leading to (22) but allow for arbitrary p (instead of p = 1/2) and write a =:â and c =: C(â).
